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Ethics Panel

Teaching Legal Ethics a Quarter of a
Century After Watergate
by
RONALD D. ROTUNDA*
I recall a poignant moment when John Dean, the former Counsel
Nixon, testified before the Senate Watergate Committee
President
to
over a quarter of a century ago. He had earlier made a list of the
people that he thought could be involved in a conspiracy to obstruct
justice. Next to many of the names was an asterisk. One of the
Senators questioning him asked what the asterisks represented. John
Dean indicated that they were the lawyers.'
Lawyers and the general public responded to that comment. The
American Bar Association ("ABA") soon decided that law schools
must offer, and law students must take, a required course in Legal
Ethics, or what is more often called Professional Responsibility.
Because the ABA is usually the accrediting agency for law schools,
universities around the country complied. Thus, since the late 1970s,
it is the unusual lawyer who, as a law student, would not have taken a
required course in Legal Ethics followed by a bar examination on that
same subject.

This bar examination is different than the rest of the
examination. Students must pass the general bar examination, but a
low score in one area, the torts section for example, can be
compensated by a high score in the contracts section. In contrast,
there is a completely separate bar examination on legal ethics and
students must pass this examination separately. A higher score
elsewhere cannot compensate for a lower score on this test. The bar
examiners were worried that students might see this extra
* The Albert E. Jenner, Jr. Professor of Law, the University of Illinois College of
Law.
1. See PresidentialCampaignActivities of 1972: HearingsBefore the Select Comm. on
the PresidentialCampaignActivities, 93rd Cong. 1054 (1978).
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examination as another barrier to entry, so they offer it several times
a year, allow applicants to take the ethics bar examination while they
are still law students, and offer it on a different day than the rest of
the bar so that preparation for that examination will not interfere
with preparation for the other bar examination.
The ethics bar examination is objective, multiple choice. That
format was chosen for several reasons. First, the purpose of the
examination is not to separate the A students from the B+ students.
The purpose is only to separate the sheep from the goats, the people
who really2 are clueless. Objective examinations serve that purpose
quite well.
It was not always so. When I started teaching at the University
of Illinois, my law school did not even offer the course, and the Legal
Ethics casebooks that existed focused on the intricacies of
unauthorized practice. In those days, it was easy for law students to
learn the Golden Rule: Thou shalt not lie, cheat, steal,.., or
advertise. In 1974 the dean asked me to teach legal ethics because I
was the new boy on the block, and it was assumed that I must know
as assistant
something about the subject since I had just left a position
3
majority counsel to the Senate Watergate Committee.
Times have changed. The emphasis on legal ethics began as part
of what Spiro Agnew referred to as our "post-Watergate morality."
Some ridicule this movement as based on a false assumption that
more study of ethics will make us more ethical. These people often
think that ethics can be taught only at mother's knee. 4
I recall a story I heard a long time ago. Two third-year law
students married each other. A year later, when both had graduated,
they took a belated honeymoon in Scotland. There, at a picturesque
country inn, the proprietress asked how long they had been married.
"It's been a year," they said. "What! A year, and no wee little ones
yet?" "Well," they responded, "we had to finish school." "You mean
2. In addition, in essay questions on legal ethics, students may seek to avoid difficult
questions by writing, "Well, I would not come close to the line; I would tell the client to
hire a different lawyer." It is easier to reject prospective clients on essay examinations
than it is in the real world. Also, an objective examination assures at least that there are
some questions where the answer is yes or no. Not everything is black or white, but some
things are. Unless one knows the rules, one will not know when a problem falls between
the cracks.
3. I was Assistant Majority Counsel to the Senate Watergate Committee from 1973 to
1974. Later, I was a Special Consultant to the Office of the Independent Counsel from
1997 to 1999.
4. See SPECIAL COMM. ON PROFESSIONALISM, ILL. STATE BAR ASS'N, THE BAR,
THE BENCH AND PROFESSIONALISM IN ILLINOIS: PROUD TRADITIONS, TOUGH NEW
PROBLEMS, CURRENT CHOICES 8 (1987) ("Heard more than once was the opinion that
one cannot teach another to be ethical.").
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in America you have to go to school for that too?"
Well, in America, we lawyers also go to school to study ethics. A
quarter of a century ago, when I started teaching legal ethics, one of
my law school colleagues asked (not in jest), "What do you do?
Teach them not to steal?" It's a little more complicated than that.
Those who think of ethics as intuition learned at their mothers' knees
are often the same people whom courts routinely disqualify because
they do not appreciate the complexities of conflicts-of-interest rules.
Attorneys are often their own worst lawyers. They know the law
affecting their clients because it is their business to know that. But
too frequently they know little about the law affecting themselves, the
law governing lawyers. The Administrator of the Illinois Attorney
Registration and Disciplinary Commission once told me that a large
percentage of lawyers pay their annual mandatory fee to support the
Disciplinary Commission with checks drawn on client trust fund
accounts.
These attorneys apparently are unaware of the
commingling rules. 5
Many lawyers today are also ignorant of recent developments
regarding ethics subjects, such as conflicts of interest and attorney
disqualification. I have chatted with lawyers who did not appreciate
the distinction between a client's "confidences" and her "secrets" and
did not realize that they were not supposed to volunteer either. 6 In
one particular situation, the lawyer displayed his ignorance at an
inopportune and inauspicious time-in the course of his deposition,
when he was being sued for malpractice. In another instance-which
occurred within the last few months-a lawyer was asked, during her
5. See generally Clark v. State Bar, 246 P.2d 1, 4 (1952) ("[C]ommingling is
committed when a client's money is intermingled with that of his attorney and its separate
identity lost so that it may be used for the attorney's personal expenses or subjected to
claims of his creditors.").
6. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL REsPoNsIBrLrry DR 4-101(A) (1980)
("'Confidence' refers to information protected by the attorney-client privilege.., and
'secret' refers to other information gained in the professional relationship that the client
has requested be held inviolate or the disclosure of which would be embarrassing or would
be likely to be detrimental to the client.").
The Model Rules do not distinguish between "confidences" and "secrets." Rather,
they protect all information "relating to representation of a client" as confidential. The
drafters of the Model Rules intended to eliminate any need for the client to specify
whether information may be disclosed, and to forbid the lawyer to speculate on whether
the information might be embarrassing or detrimental if disclosed. See MODEL RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCr Rule 1.6(a) cmt. (1998) (Model Code Comparison).
Both the Model Code and the Model Rules provide that even information not
protected as an evidentiary privilege must be kept confidential (unless an exception
applies, such as a court ordering the lawyer to testify). See MODEL CODE OF
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 4-101; MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCr Rule 1.6(a).
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deposition, as to whether she had secured her client's waiver of a
even know what a conflict waiver is,
conflict. Her response: "I don't
'7
if you want to know the truth."

Several years ago, one of my former academic colleagues, who
also practiced law, was asked whether she bought malpractice
insurance, and whether it was expensive to obtain for a part-time
practitioner. She responded that she did not have to buy insurance
because her contract with her clients required them to waive any
malpractice claims against her. Her listeners nodded knowingly until
I mentioned that her standard waiver agreement violated state ethics
rules, was not enforceable, and could cause her to lose her license. 8
One need not rely on anecdotal analysis. The few empirical
studies show that lawyers often are unaware of even basic
information about the law governing lawyers. 9 While most new
entrants to the legal profession must pass a professional responsibility
examination, older lawyers, who draw a disproportionate number of
malpractice suits, 10 either have never formally studied ethics or have

not kept up with the developments in the law. Many of these
malpractice suits arise out of violations of professional ethics. 11
Please reread the preceding two sentences:

While most new entrants to the legal profession must pass a
professional responsibility examination, older lawyers, who draw a
disproportionate number of malpractice suits, either have never
7. This is an exact quotation from her deposition.
8. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.8(h) ("A lawyer shall not
make an agreement prospectively limiting the lawyer's liability to a client for malpractice
unless permitted by law and the client is independently represented in making the
agreement.").
Illinois then, and now, has a similar rule derived from the ABA model. Compare
ILLINOIS CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 6-102(a) (1987), with MODEL
CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 6-102(A).
9. See, e.g., Special Project, The Attorney-Client Privilegein Multiple Party Situations,
8 COLuM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 179, 180 (1972) (reporting that its "survey revealed a
general lack of awareness among attorneys as to when the attorney-client privilege will
apply to inter-attorney exchanges of information").
10. See COMMISSION ON PROFESSIONALISM, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, "... IN
THE SPIRIT OF PUBLIC SERVICE": A BLUEPRINT FOR THE REKINDLING OF LAWYER
PROFESSIONALISM 24 n.83 (1986), reprinted in 112 F.R.D. 243 n.83 (1987). See also
Ronald D. Rotunda, Lawyers and Professionalism:A Commentary on the Report of the
American Bar Association Commission on Professionalism, 18 LOY. U. CH. LJ.1149
(1987).
11. See, e.g., William H. Gates, The Newest Data on Lawyers' Malpractice Claims,
A.B.A. J., Apr. 1984, at 78, 80 (a significant proportion of malpractice claims arise from
violations of professional responsibility, including 9.35% from failure to obtain a client's
consent or to inform a client, 4.79% from failure to follow a client's instructions, and
3.39% from conflicts of interest).
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formally studied ethics or have not kept up with the developments in
the law. Many of these malpractice suits arise out of violations of
professional ethics.
Does teaching ethics matter? Have the last twenty-five years
made any difference? People still miss a statute of limitations filing
deadline, but many malpractice suits now arise out of legal ethics
violations. And the people who commit these legal ethics violations
are disproportionately older lawyers who have not studied legal ethics
in law school.
In recent years, several major, well-respected law firms have
settled various malpractice claims based on ethical violations for
substantial sums:
New York's Rogers & Wells settled, for $40 million, a case in
which it continued to represent a client
after it should have known
12
that the client was perpetrating a fraud.
Baltimore's Venable, Baetjer & Howard
settled, for $27 million,
13
a lawsuit involving conflicts of interests.
New York's Milberg Weiss settled, for $50 million, a malicious
prosecution case brought against a lawyer. The law firm, after losing
a jury verdict for $45 million for malicious prosecution, settled by
wiring a check for
$50 million before the jury could deliberate on
14
punitive damages.

The ramifications of ethical violations are not limited to
malpractice or discipline. Courts have imposed other sanctions, such
as a loss of fees. 5 That serves to get the lawyer's attention.
Malpractice insurers understand what is happening. Such
insurers are imposing risk management on the law firms that they
insure by conducting courses on matters such as conflict of interests.
The insurers know that many malpractice claims now arise from such
12. See Mary A. Galante, After a $40M Payment, It's Not Over Yet for Rogers &
Wells, NAT'L L.J., Apr. 14,1986, at 1.
13. See Kirk Victor, Venable Agrees to $27M Accord, NAT'L LJ., May 25,1987, at 3.
14. See Richard B. Schmitt, Milberg Weiss Agrees to Pay $50 Million to Settle Lexecon
Case, WALL ST. J., Apr. 14, 1999, at B17; Karen Donovan, Milberg Weiss' $50M Mistake,
NAT'L L.., Apr. 26,1999, at Al.
15. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 6
(Proposed Final Draft No. 2, April 6, 1998) ("Judicial Remedies Available to Client and
Nonclient for Lawyer Wrongs"); United States v. Strawser, 800 F.2d 704, 708 (7th Cir.
1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 906 (1987) (where the court ordered the lawyer to disgorge
excessive fees under the guidelines found in both the Illinois Code of Professional
Responsibility DR 2-106 and Model Code of Professional Responsibility DR 2-106). Cf
In re Futuronics Corp., 655 F.2d 463, 468-71 (2d Cir. 1981), cert denied, 455 U.S. 941
(1982) (where the court denied a law firm over one million dollars in fees under the
Bankruptcy Code because of a prohibited fee-splitting arrangement and failure to comply
with disclosure provisions for joint representation).
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topics, and the risks are reduced when the lawyers know the
applicable law of ethics.
One accomplished lawyer told me that, about fifteen years ago,
when he began working for a well-known malpractice insurer, the
head lawyer told him to read, first, the ABA Model Rules, cover-tocover. He was, at first, surprised: What does this have to do with
insuring law firms? After a short time on the job, he learned that a
major risk with blue chip law firms is not that they are likely to miss a
statute of limitations; it is that they will be involved in a conflict. And
for that, one has to know and understand the conflicts rules and how
the courts apply and interpret them.
What we call "lawyer's ethics" is law, not a suggestion. Just like
Securities Regulation, or Antitrust Law, it can be taught and must be
learned. A lawyer who knows Antitrust Law is more likely to keep
his client out of trouble than one who has not studied it. Similarly, a
lawyer who knows the law governing the practice of law, the Law of
Lawyering, 16 is more likely to keep himself out of trouble than the
lawyer who has not studied it.
The ethics rules are not merely trendy lip service to our better
selves. Most jurisdictions have adopted, as court rules, both the
ABA's Model Rules of Professional Conduct and Model Code of
Judicial Conduct. 17 These model codes have thus become law in the
same way that the Rules of Civil Procedure have become law. These
ethics rules, which impose substantive requirements on lawyers and
judges, are also just as complex as the rules of civil practice or the
rules of evidence. Many of the ethics rules cannot be known through
some sort of innate or hereditary awareness automatically infused in
ordinary human beings once they are admitted to the bar. Nor can
they be learned at mother's knee. Unless a lawyer is risk-prone, he or
she will need to understand the Law of Legal Ethics.
The complexities of this subject has led to the publication of
several important books on this subject, all created to offer lawyers
and judges an analysis of, and an initiation to, this complex topic. 18 In
16. See GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. & W. WILLIAM HODES, THE LAW OF
LAWYERING: A HANDBOOK ON THE MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (2d
ed. 1990).
17. Few of us are, or will become, judges, but many of the issues that concern judges
also concern the lawyers who practice before them, such as when a judge must disqualify
herself when a judge may be disciplined; and when judges may receive gifts or loans.
Lawyers, after all, cannot give to the judge that which the judge may not receive. In
addition, a lawyer cannot know when to move to disqualify a judge if she does not know
when the judicial rules provide that the judge should be disqualified.
18. Useful sources include: ANNOTATED MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCr (4th ed. 1999); ABA/BNA LAWYERS' MANUAL ON PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT
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addition, the American Law Institute has recently completed its
massive project on this subject-Restatement (Third) of the Law
Governing Lawyers.19
The ABA has proposed Model Rules for lawyers and for judges,
and almost all jurisdictions base their ethics rules on these ABA
products. Even when a jurisdiction, such as California, uses a
different format, the substantive rules reflect the substantial ABA
influence. But the source of legal ethics requirements is not limited to
these rules. They are much more numerous, which makes legal
research more difficult for the uninitiated. Many jurisdictions
supplement the ABA rules that they adopt with their own rules
dealing with special subjects, such as family law, or contingency fees,
or sanctions for frivolous motions. 20 There is also the case law, the
commentators, and advisory ethics opinions of various bar
associations as well as the opinions of the ABA Ethics Committee,
which have become particularly influential. Those lawyers unfamiliar
with legal ethics find it difficult to access these numerous and diverse
sources.
And so, there has grown up a substantial, relatively, new area of
expertise, lawyers representing lawyers. It has been said that
eighteenth century England was a nation of shopkeepers: The people
became prosperous simply by everybody selling retail goods to each
other. Perhaps some day we won't need any clients; we'll just sue
each other.
Part of the legacy of Watergate has been this creation of a new
legal speciality: the speciality of legal ethics. The old bon mot that
one should be careful for what one wishes, because it may become
true, applies to this legacy. The ABA successfully required law
schools to teach legal ethics. And, one of the results has been the
(looseleaf, multivolume, periodically updated); CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN
LEGAL ETHICS (1986); GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. & W. WILLIAM HODES, THE LAW

OF LAWYERING: A HANDBOOK ON THE MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT
(2d ed. 1990). On judicial ethics, see JEFFREY M. SHAMAN ET AL., JUDICIAL CONDUCT
AND ETHICS (1995); RICHARD H. UNDERWOOD & WILLIAM H. FORTUNE, TRIAL

ETHICS (1988). On the tort of legal malpractice, see RONALD E. MALLEN & JEFFREY M.
SMITH, LEGAL MALPRACTICE (4th ed. 1996).
The ABA and the West Group, a division of Thompson Publishing International, will
publish, later this year, my book on the subject, covering both legal ethics and judicial
ethics, RONALD D. ROTUNDA, LEGAL ETHICS: THE LAWYER'S DESKBOOK ON
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY (forthcoming).

19. While this Restatement is titled, "Restatement (Third)," there was no
"Restatement (First)," or "Restatement (Second)," resulting in confusion for all but the
cognoscenti.
20. Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure deals with sanctions for frivolous
motions. Many states have similar rules. See, eg., 22 N.Y.C.R.R. Pt. 130.
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lawyers and law professors, when they turned to the legal rules,
discovered that they did not often like what they saw. What followed
from that relevation has been a series of law suits successfully
challenging ethics rules and invalidating them on constitutional or
statutory grounds. For example, antitrust laws served to invalidate
the ethics rules that mandated minimum fees. 2' And the First
Amendment has served to invalidate a host of other restrictions,
ranging from advertising to direct mail.22
Thus, the development of legal ethics as a special body of law has
become part of the legacy of Watergate.

21. See Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773,793 (1975).
22. See generally Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350 (1977) (advertising);
Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Ass'n, 486 U.S. 466 (1988) (direct mail advertising). See Ronald
D. Rotunda, Reporting Sensational Trials:Free Press,a Responsible Press,and Cameras in
the Courts, 3 COMM. L. & POL'Y 295 (No. 2, Spring 1998); Ronald D. Rotunda,
Professionalism, Legal Advertising, and Free Speech in the Wake of Florida Bar v. Went
For It, Inc., 49 ARK. L. REV. 703 (1997).

"Conceptions of Legality"
transcribedremarks of
WILLIAM H. SIMON*
One difficulty in assessing the influence and impact of Watergate
arises from the ambiguity of the legal and ethical stakes in that
episode. The lesson that we took from Watergate was that lawyers
owe respect for law. But there are many different conceptions of
respect for law. In particular, in American culture, there are two
quite different ones that often compete with each other.
In the first conception, law is seen in relatively categorical and
authoritarian terms. Law is identified with explicit rules formally
promulgated by the state. Compliance seems to be largely a matter of
relatively mechanical decision-making. Stopping at the traffic light if
it's red and not driving over sixty-five exemplify this conception of
law.
But there is another conception which sees law as an expression
of basic values that are only partially codified in the enactments of the
State. In this conception, compliance calls for more complex and
contextual judgment. Norms like due process, reasonable care, and
privacy exemplify this conception of law.
Often these two conceptions are complementary, but sometimes
they are in conflict, and some of the most interesting debates about
legal ethics arise from situations when they conflict. For example,
consider the series of legal ethics dilemmas, the classic ones that arise
from situations when pursuing the client's interests conflicts with
some value that is fundamental but not fully codified in a formally
enacted rule. Examples of this include cross-examining the truthful
witness, and non-disclosure of a material fact when there is no specific
rule that requires disclosure of the fact.
Now, these dilemmas acquire their resonance from the fact that
we have a feeling that there are important, legally relevant values at
stake that are not codified in formally enacted rules. The conflict
between the relatively mechanical conception of law, legal obligation,
and ethics and the relatively complex and contextual conception also
* William W. and Gertrude H. Saunders Professor of Law, Stanford University Law
School.
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plays out in a variety of issues about compliance with law. The
mechanical conception tends to support a notion of a categorical duty
to comply with at least the literal terms of all laws-rules that satisfy
some test of formal enactment. The more complex, contextual view
suggests that there may be some situations in which the literal terms
of a formal enactment are outweighed by some less formal but more
fundamental value.
So, we have, for example, quite prominent in our culture the idea
of virtuous non-compliance with formally enacted legal rules. There
are many episodes of virtuous non-compliance in American historythink of the Underground Railroad or the Birmingham Civil Rights
March. And then on a more mundane level, the contextual view
seems more compatible with the everyday lawlessness of people
whom we usually think of as generally law-abiding. When I drove in
today, I went seventy miles an hour, which was a violation of the law.
I'm guessing the majority of you violated the law as you came in
today. This may regrettable in many respects, but most of us do not
regard it as a serious affront to the rule of law in general. That is
because in the more contextual view, legal obligation is not a binary,
either/or decision. Legal duties have a spectrum of relative weights,
relative importance, and relative unimportance, and we can
distinguish between those that involve very substantial stakes and
relatively unsubstantial stakes.
In Watergate, there was no occasion to consider the conflict
between the mechanical and the contextual conceptions of law, legal
obligation, and ethics. That is, the conduct involved in Watergate was
inarguably, as John Dean said a little while ago, a violation of the
literal terms of criminal statutes.' It was also, as I think he also said,
an affront to less formal and fundamental values of privacy and
democracy.
However, in the post-Watergate elaboration of legal ethics, I
think that the relatively mechanical conception of legality has
received disproportionate emphasis. The way we now tend to teach
our students legal ethics in the courses that have been mandated in
the wake of Watergate tends to emphasize relatively mechanical,
unreflective rule-following at the expense of relatively complex
contextual judgment. Think of the Model Rules, for example, that
the ABA promulgated in the aftermath of Watergate and that are
now the doctrinal core of all legal ethics courses or at least most of
them. The Model Rules were explicitly drafted for the purpose of
creating black letter rules (that is the term that the drafters used) that
obviate complex judgment. The predecessor code of the ABA
1. See John W. Dean, III, Watergate: What Was It?, 51 HASTINGS LJ. 609,619 (2000).
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actually had a series of norms that were designed to inspire complex
judgment-the so-called "ethical considerations"-aspirational norms
that were eliminated in the Model Rules precisely to reduce legal
ethics to a matter of black letter rule following. And then consider
the Multistate Professional Responsibility Exam that Ron Rotunda
mentioned. The multistate exam, of course, is the main test of ethical
understanding of new entrants to the bar in most states. Until this
year it consisted entirely of multiple choice, machine-graded
questions and answers. When you are taking a bar review course
designed to prepare you to take this test, the instructors will often tell
you quite explicitly "Don't think too much when you're answering
these questions. What is being tested is not your ability to think but
your ability to regurgitate a series of rote answers."
Now, I think it is interesting to speculate whether the Clinton
impeachment scandal will cause any change in our orientation toward
legal ethics and in particular toward these two conceptions of legality.
It may cause us to wonder whether we have emphasized the
mechanical conception too much at the expense of the contextual
conception. Part of this depends on your views of some of the merits
of the Clinton impeachment scandal. One widely held though
controversial view of the Clinton impeachment scandal implies that
the two conceptions were in conflict there. In this view, the President
clearly did violate the literal terms of a relevant formally enacted rule.
On the other hand, other more fundamental but less formal values of
democracy and privacy were jeopardized, not so much by the conduct
of the President, as by the conduct of his prosecutor. Now, the
President's lawyers certainly compounded, in the view that I am
describing, the damage and the danger that was done by defending his
conduct, not in terms of principled appeals to privacy and democracy,
but in terms of legalistic nitpicking.
But if you accept this
interpretation of the Clinton impeachment scandal, and I want to
acknowledge that it is controversial, then you will be inclined to
entertain the possibility that part of the problem may have been
twenty-five years of ethics education that encouraged lawyers and law
students to think of ethical obligation in terms of relatively
unreflective compliance with formal rules. This type of education has
de-emphasized, sometimes quite consciously and deliberately, duties
of complex judgment and notions of obligation to fundamental but
informal values.

*

*

*

